De un accionista de PDVSA a otro

Jamás he trabajado ni en la vieja ni en la nueva Pdvsa, pero justo por ser uno de esos accionistas minoritarios ignorados, que somos todos los venezolanos, creo saber más lo que nos conviene con respecto a nuestro petróleo que toda esa cuerda de políticos que sólo buscan distribuir las ganancias a su conveniencia, o las gerencias, cuya prioridad son sus condiciones de trabajo. No perdono la revolucracia actual, que supongo deben estar haciendo tales horrores que ni se dejan ver, como tampoco enmudecí en bobalicona admiración ante la meritocracia anterior. Amigos accionistas, he aquí lo que pienso.

Sin una OPEP, jamás podríamos recibir por nuestro petróleo agotable y no renovable un precio superior al del costo marginal de extraerlo y transportarlo a nivel mundial, destino triste de todos los demás productores de materia primas, por lo que soy un fiel defensor del concepto OPEP. Quien le juegue quiquirigüiqui a la OPEP... ¡Fuera!

Estar en la OPEP, obliga a poder controlar la producción, por lo que la exploración, la producción y la refinación básica deben estar 100% en manos de empresas del Estado. Una empresa del Estado es generalmente menos eficiente que una privada, pero como a nosotros lo que nos interesa es el resultado final del negocio, tendremos que convivir con ello y ser vigilantes.

Todas las empresas, tanto estatales como privadas, pueden caer en la tentación de crecer por crecer y diluir en actividades no competitivas lo que ya debería formar parte de nuestro dividendo. En este sentido, hay que prohibirle a Pdvsa cualquier actividad distinta a las más básicas. Por ejemplo la distribución de gasolina en Venezuela y en el exterior y las actividades sociales propias del gobierno... ¡Fuera!

Dividendos. Después de apartar los recursos para que Pdvsa pueda acometer sus inversiones, sin necesidad de endeudarse, el remanente se debe entregar directamente a nosotros, los accionistas. Eso de seguir entregándoles el ingreso por la liquidación de nuestro petróleo a unos políticos para luego tener que hacerles las mil y una reverencias... ¡Fuera!

Amigos, estamos hartos de oír a los políticos prometer una mejor distribución de la riqueza petrolera, como si acaso fuese de ellos, cuando lo que les toca es simplemente entregarnos nuestros cheques. Si necesitan ingresos, pues que cobren sus impuestos. Un país se construye haciendo al ciudadano responsable, no declarándolo irresponsable.

El Universal

The OPEC that I want to see

Towards the end of 1980, oil of optimum grade such as Arabian Light was being sold at US$ 36 per barrel. By the end of 1998, its price had fallen to US$ 12.20. The latter is equivalent to US$ 6.50 in 1980 US dollar terms, and represents only 18% of its value in 1980. This would seem to imply that whatever the strategy was that OPEC used to defend its oil was simply dead wrong.

This situation was so disastrous that at the end of 1998 the only alternatives that were ventilated publicly were either to violently increase production capacity or to simply sell or privatize the entire industry.

To limit oneself to the simple increase in production capacity would be to repeat the same errors that were committed with the other raw materials and natural non-renewable resources. It would mean to resign oneself to receiving the marginal contribution that results from being the sector’s low cost producer. It is sad that a country that has been so blessed with a valuable resource such as oil has to adopt a model that, at the end of the day, would let it to sell it at the variable cost of production. Something like receiving a valuable family inheritance and then turning around and selling it for what it costs to wrap it and ship it to the buyer.

In the same vein, the outright privatization of the oil sector would eliminate all possibility of geopolitic negotiation and the only thing we would receive as a going away present would be the resources to solve the existential problems of an entire generation of Venezuelans that have, for the last 20 years, not been able to decide if they were coming or going and that lived in a sort of Limbo State in the duty free zone of our international airport.

Today, when OPEC, for well know reasons (albeit not well recognized reasons) has received a new lease on life, it would be naughty not to wish it success in taking advantage of this second wind to build itself into a solid organization capable of facing the new challenges. If it fails, this will surely be its last breath. This is why I wish to share with you what I would consider the OPEC I want.

The OPEC I want would be able to win the confidence of all of its members in order to consolidate in one single block all the resources necessary to really defend it oil. These resources go far and beyond the simple turning of the tap.

The OPEC I want would be one that, upon observing how consumer nations have usurped the value of oil by increasing taxes (the UK, for example, increased taxes from 85% in 1980 to 456% ad valorem in 1998), would humbly accept the fact that they have lost the battle to an able opponent, but is now regrouping in order to win the war.

The OPEC I want would train the world’s100 best environmentalists in order to insure that, even though it shares the conviction and responsibility of taking care of our fragile world, the costs of defending the latter would not be laid squarely and unjustly on oil’s shoulders and that the environmentalist’s arguments will not be used for other hypocritical ends.

The OPEC I want would train the world’s 100 best experts in international commerce who would help avoid measures like direct subsidies for carbon as well as taxes that are aimed directly at oil and not at other sources of energy and that are evidently discriminatory and therefore not permitted under the norms established by the World Trade Organization.

The OPEC I want would train the world’s 1000 best scientists who would work in the world’s best laboratories and study, research and develop new uses for oil in order to minimize pollution or maximize added value as well as alternate sources of energy that could be used in the future.

The OPEC I want would not recognize the rights to intellectual property, brands and patents that, like a rabbit pulled out of a hat, generate income for the countries that own these rights which are definitely renewable, while the income obtained from the sale of a non-renewable natural resource such as oil is simultaneously being treated in a discriminatory fashion.

The OPEC I want simply would not allow a company to abscond with a hefty portion of the value of oil because it has formulated an additive that (supposedly) permits gasoline to be less polluting and based on a process that has dubiously been patented.

The OPEC I want would train the best image and marketing advisors in order to insure that the world’s public opinion does not continuously receive distorted information about OPEC and its members.

The OPEC I want would be staffed with the best team of diplomats and negotiators that would insure adequate representation at all international forums.

The OPEC I want would not allow gas and other sources of energy who’s values are not set under the OPEC umbrella to be introduced into the market like Trojan horses in order to compete with oil.

The OPEC I want knows that it counts with other resources other than oil to defend itself. The mere addition of all its international purchasing power would allow it to receive better treatment by imposing uniform special duties on all those who discriminate against oil.

The OPEC I want would not be formed by managers that think that their only objective is to perform comfortable bureaucratic tasks, but rather by soldiers that know and accept that they are on a mission aimed at improving the lot of their nations and that borders on being sacred.

The OPEC I want knows that it is not totally unimportant and is able to rally the solid support of its members and above all, of the population of its member countries.

The citizens of countries belonging to the OPEC I want know that even though their happiness and well being does not depend only on oil, it does depend on being able to defend what is theirs.

In the OPEC I want everyone prays to his respective God to give them strength to take full advantage of the meeting in Caracas.

In the Daily Journal, Caracas,Venezuela, October 3, 2000

I privatize you, I privatize you not

The sad truth is that for a very long time now - decades really - the country simply has not had anything even remotely close to a coherent economic policy. Without one, it will be very difficult to drag the country out of its current emergency, the bottom line of which is serious unemployment and poverty. I still have fresh in my mind that infamous cocktail of eighty “urgent” measures presented to the previous administration by Fedecámaras.

 

It is even more difficult to find a good direction due to the fact that our dilemma as a country is situated within the context of globalization process that seems to threaten national identities even further.

 

In these circumstances, it is no wonder that magic, instant solutions, and quick fixes seem to be coming from everywhere. Among these, none is more beautiful and tempting than the privatization of PDVSA. It seems to be to the economy what the Constituent Assembly is to politics.

 

Before I continue on this track, I wish to make the point that by referring to a state- run oil industry I refer only to activities in exploration, extraction, refining and distribution to basic markets. All other downstream business such as the petrochemical field, among others, is subject to such intense competition that the cruel efficiencies of the private sector are required for it to be successful. Any intervention by the State in this secondary business, can only result in the loss of part of the riches initially created by the basic activities mentioned above. There is not doubt that downstream business must be privatized.

 

We return, then, to the beautiful siren song (the sirens themselves are not so beautiful): The sale of PDVSA and oil reserves, Nirvana, Shangri-La and immediate gratification.

 

Evidently, it is not logical for a country as potentially rich as Venezuela to be in the state it is in. The sale of PDVSA could mean, among other things, that we could cancel all of our public debt. If we were able to resist taking on new debt, there is no doubt that the country would have a rather promising future, at least in the short and medium term.

 

Evidently, any industry that is not subjected to the critical and continuous surveillance by a greedy owner, can easily be led astray and would produce unsatisfactory results.

 

Evidently, it would not seem to make any difference who really owns PDVSA’s assets. The source of business would remain in Venezuela and the country would continue to benefit from royalties and income tax.

 

Why is it then, that like Ulysses, I would want to be strapped to the main mast in order to resist the siren song? My reasons are partly intellectual and partly from the heart.

 

On the intellectual side, the most important reason is that I am not convinced that the country can maximize the value of its oil without OPEC. The privatization of PDVSA would in essence mean our disincorporation from OPEC. This does not mean I am expressing satisfaction with the management of OPEC, which leaves much room for criticism.

 

The interests of the current players, management and the government, may be in conflict with those of the Nation. Additionally, there is no effective way to evaluate management of the industry. The sirens affirm that the privatization of PDVSA would solve this problem since its valuation in the open market would be a measure of management’s success, and would indicate the way forward. Personally, I believe one way to solve the problem is to require the transparency of information and to create the Office of the Oil Ombudsman. This would allow for the introduction of some national and long-term variables, which are frequently ignored in an increasingly globalized, and short term oriented marketplace.

 

Notwithstanding, I do admit that in these times, irrational reasons driven by the heart may be weightier by far. To begin with, I am not among those that disqualify the government as a manager.

 

Defense of oil requires decisive protest against those that prohibit the use of Orimulsion without reason, and against those that impose confiscatory taxes on oil derivatives, meaning that we receive only a fraction of its value. I still have not lost hope that this need for defensive action could rally us to unite as a nation and not simply as greedy individual shareholders.

 

I do not believe that as a generation that has failed in its management of oil resources we have the moral right to continue to anticipate even more cash flow. 

 

Should PDVSA actually be privatized and should there be a surplus that can be distributed, I hope it will be distributed among Venezuelans under 21. This opinion will most likely be contrary to that of those people that preach privatization of PDVSA in the same way children try to get to the end-of-party gifts in order to get away early from a boring piñata.

On the other hand, I recognize the value of all the arguments against centralization of fiscal income. Quickly, please... tie me to the mast! 

De la pobre imagen de la Opep y de ventajas comparativas

De la pobre imagen de la Opep y de ventajas comparativas

Mensaje para la OCI. Hace unos 25 años, durante la explosión de los precios petroleros, en las gasolineras europeas, colocaban letreros que indicaban que de dicho precio sólo una pequeña porción correspondía a impuestos, imputando los altos precios a los "bandidos" de la OPEP. Desde entonces, los miembros de la OPEP hemos tenido una mala imagen, que se ha consolidado así en el tiempo gracias a los innumerables “reportajes” negativos sobre los “Jeques de la OPEP” publicados reiteradamente por la prensa europea, en donde proliferaban calificativos tales como antidemocráticos, usureros, irrespetuosos de los derechos de la mujer, jugadores y pretenciosos compradores de las mejores propiedades europeas.

En Junio de este año, de acuerdo a cifras suministradas por la Asociación de Expendedores de Gasolina de Inglaterra, de los Bs. 661 cobrados por cada litro de gasolina, el Fisco inglés retiene Bs. 552, al distribuidor le tocan Bs. 42 y el productor de la gasolina, aquél que tuvo que vender un activo no renovable, debe conformarse con unos míseros Bs. 68, que apenas representan un 11% del precio.

Hoy cuando le reclamamos a un europeo la injusticia anterior, puede que nos oiga, pero no nos escucha, probablemente debido a la ya mencionada imagen de "bandidos de la OPEP" que tenemos, aunque no seamos “los malos” de la partida. De allí que para lograr combatir los impuestos petroleros, sea indispensable combatir antes que nada esa distorsionada imagen.

No soy publicista, pero les confieso que dentro del marco de esta campaña de cambio de imagen, me provocaría publicar en Londres, Berlín, París, Madrid, Tokio y tantos sitios más, una tabla actualizada que, comparando los Bs. 552 que cobra el Fisco con los Bs. 68 del productor, evidencie la existencia de un simulado arancel comercial discriminatorio de más del 800%. Al lado publicaría fotos alusivas a la pobreza que sufre nuestro país y terminaría por acusarlos de ser unos grandes hipócritas por cuanto, mientras se dan golpes de pecho por el libre comercio y los derechos humanos, sólo son unos vulgares petro-piratas. 

Igualmente publicaría mensajes dirigidos a los ambientalistas, quienes no son más que los tontos útiles de los petro-piratas, a quienes les dedicaría fotos de los tendidos eléctricos que construimos hasta Brasil, amenazando la reserva de oxígeno del mundo, todo cortesía de una política de impuestos al petróleo que nos tiene empobrecidos y que de seguir, quien sabe, un día puede que nos obligue a usar la selva amazónica para producir carbón.

Obligaría a los medios de comunicación a suministrar diariamente, no sólo el precio del barril a nivel del productor, sino también el cobrado a nivel de consumidor, para que el mundo pueda percatarse de que el precio promedio mundial de un barril, a nivel del consumidor, probablemente ya haya traspasado la barrera de los US$ 100. 

Para quienes pongan en duda esto, consideren que de cada barril de petróleo se puede simultáneamente obtener 84 litros de gasolina, 12 de jet fuel, 36 de gasoil, 16 de lubricantes y 12 de residuales pesados. Si apenas calculamos el valor de los 84 litros de gasolina, cuyo precio mínimo en el mundo, exceptuando los Estados Unidos, es de US$ 1 por litro, ya tendríamos $ 84 por barril. De allí que aquéllos que hace años predijeron un valor superior a US$ 100 por barril de petróleo, no estaban equivocados, sólo erraron en quiénes se quedarían con el dinero.

Mensaje para Cordiplan. La teoría del Libre Comercio se fundamenta en explotar las ventajas comparativas de cada país. A partir de 1989, Venezuela inició, con gran entusiasmo, una apertura comercial que nos ha llevado a ser uno de los países más abiertos del mundo. En el camino firmamos todos los convenios requeridos, aún aquéllos que, como los de patentes y propiedad intelectual, nos parecían más destinados a conservar las supremacías existentes, que a fomentar nuestro crecimiento económico. 

Creo que tenemos el derecho de sentirnos confundidos y decepcionados. Al accesar el mercado internacional para nuestro principal producto, el petróleo, nos hemos topado con unos aranceles disimulados del 800% y además, en muchas de las áreas donde tradicionalmente se veían ventajas comparativas, éstas parecen haberse esfumado.

Gracias a asesores, como el F.M.I., hemos renunciado a fertilizantes baratos. Para el gas, ya hemos aceptado el concepto, bastante extraño por cuanto colide con el de las ventajas comparativas, de que es preferible que éste se pierda, antes de introducir en nuestra economía la “distorsión” de cobrar un precio menor al del mercado internacional. 

A causa de las privatizaciones, destinadas más a incrementar los ingresos del Fisco, que a garantizarle servicios confiables y accesibles al usuario, hoy estamos renunciando tanto a la tradicional energía barata, como a las posibilidades de desarrollo que ofrece Internet, al limitársenos acceder al mismo por las altas tarifas telefónicas. Parece que el país, en lugar de usar sus ventajas comparativas, las estuviera vendiendo.

Para los petro-piratas, es un dolor de cabeza que algunos países mantengan los impuestos al petróleo bajos. Así, algunas de sus industrias que requieran de este insumo, pueden estar tentadas a mudarse, perdiéndose entonces fuentes de trabajo. Esta debe ser la razón por la cual se presiona sobre Venezuela para que aumente los precios de la gasolina, aún cuando, los Bs. 68 que por un litro de gasolina puesto en Londres recibe el productor, no son muy distintos al neto que recibe el país, después de gastos de distribución, de los Bs. 80 por litro de gasolina alta, puesto en El Tigre.

A Nation Guilty Of Innocence

In a European country (it does not really matter which it is since in this sense they are pretty much alike), out of every US$ 100 that a motorist spends on gasoline, $ 85 goes towards taxes, $ 5 to cover the cost of distribution and $ 10 or less to pay for the refined product itself. In other words, the amount that a country will be paid in order to extract this non-renewable resource is actually peanuts.

The 85% that goes to the European taxman is nothing other than a simple duty. In normal markets, a fall in oil prices of about 55% should technically result in an increase in consumption. In Europe, however, gasoline prices remain basically the same. This means that the tax authorities simply took advantage of the above-mentioned fall in prices to simply increase their collections.

I am among those that believe that the solutions to Venezuela’s current financial crisis will require much more than a simple increase in oil prices. Among other things, I feel it is necessary to develop a real national conscience which will allows us to properly defend our own interests. Ironically, I don’t see any other place to begin but with our own oil.

Should Venezuela have properly invested the resources obtained during the oil boom, it would definitely been in a better financial position. However, should it not have recycled this income it would have simply aggravated the global recession and would have been considered a pariah. There is no doubt that Venezuela’s crime was to spend and give away excessively. An example of this excess is that the overspending did not only include oil income but indebtedness as well.

However, neither the excess generosity described above, even if it borders on stupidity, nor the country’s masochistic streak (nobody can deny that our problems are self-inflicted) should result in the loss of fair and respectful treatment from the rest of the world.

Because of this, it angers me no end that in spite of the fact that Venezuela is suffering due to low oil prices, the country is not being offered other alternatives to restructure its debt other that suicide by way of the ingestion of 20 year credits at 20% interest per annum available in the marginal emerging market.

The taxes imposed by Europe on gasoline (while they also promote free markets), the prohibition on Orimulsion imposed by Florida (the entity that benefits the most due to its attraction for Venezuelans), and finally, the usurious demands made by the financial markets are sufficient evidence to prove that, even if it seems like a contradiction in terms and even when globalization continues to steam along, it is basically up to every man to look out for himself.

When we also note that the developed world spends huge amount of resources to co-opt those that ‘misbehave’, logic would seem to imply that one simply has to play hardball.

It would seem to me that something like a suspension of landing rights in Venezuela for flights from Florida as a response to that state’s continued imposition of its ban on Orimulsion simply in order to favor some particular local interests, is a fairly civilized level of roughness, specially when compared to what is going on in, for example, Kosovo.

It would seem to me that something like a special duty imposed by Venezuela (preferably backed by OPEC) on all products coming from countries that locally apply a direct tax on oil products is neither worse nor different than all the conflicts being debated today in the international commercial system.

It would seem to me that we would not be asking too much from the United States if we propose to restructure all of our external debt on 30 year terms at an interest rate of 0.5% over Treasury Rates to be repaid in advance if and when the price of oil goes over US$ 30 per barrel. Especially if we consider the expense the USA undertakes in order to build its strategic oil reserves by burying them in underground deposits or in militarily guaranteeing access to other strategically important areas. Especially if we consider that after such a restructure, Venezuela, with a fairly small debt, would immediately merit a much better credit rating than many of the other countries, currently favored by the markets.

Hunger is a violation of human rights. In my country innocent people are suffering from hunger, most of them as a direct result of populism. The battle against internal populism, however, often results in falling into the trap of innocently accepting imposed external economic populism, more often than not resulting in more hunger. It is high time Venezuela defends its own interests by not consistently bending over backwards.

In the Daily Journal, Caracas, February 26, 1999

Should we abandon OPEC?

Alternative 1: Continue in OPEC, produce little oil and sell it at reasonably high prices. Alternative 2: Abandon OPEC, expand production capacity and sell oil at relatively low prices, while conquering new markets in the process.

Venezuela’s future oil policy should lie somewhere on the axis formed by these extremes. We, as citizens, should supposedly form our own opinion as to where this ideal point should lie.

Over the last 20 years, I have consistently questioned the logic of a policy under which the members of a cartel have turned a blind eye to the diminishing strength of the latter, almost as if on purpose. This is the case of OPEC, which has, year after year, lost market share. In this sense, the only plausible response to the proposal of going out and aggressively conquering new markets should be “let’s go for it”.

Unfortunately, it is not quite like that. Even though I support this proposal on technical terms, I can’t quite seem to drum up enthusiasm. Neither because of the possibility of revindicating myself with an egoistic but savory “I told you so”, nor because of the possible inherent promise of the plan itself. The cause of my indifference is none other than my conviction that such a decision is in itself of little importance for the future of the country.

It does not suffice to follow a coherent oil sector policy. What really matters to the country is its final result. A decision that is technically wrong but produces satisfactory results is clearly better than the opposite. As far as the future of my country is concerned, I am not interested in applying the medical phrase that certifies that “the operation was a success, but the patient unfortunately has died”.

In its initial phases, OPEC generated large volumes of resources for Venezuela; more than sufficient to set the country on the road to development. This did not occur and there is no reason to believe that the country will manage to reap the non-perishable fruits of this development even if the next oil policy is successful.

Even though I realize that it is not popular today, and feeling a bit like a prehistoric hippie predicating “Love is all we need”, I will risk whispering the statement “oil is a valuable natural, non-renewable resource”.

Since oil is indeed valuable and because it is not renewable, prices have once upon a time been pushed up to nearly $ 40 per barrel and projected prices should probably be around $300 today. Since oil is valuable and non-renewable, it was also said that before liquidating it at low prices it would be better to leave it in the ground (for the benefit of our grandchildren).

If we were not all, myself included, simple egoists itching to get our hands on resources that would allow us to once again live an easy and happy life, we should really be leaving the oil in the ground today, thereby insuring the future of our country and our children. Not until the price is right (the current market price of US$ 12 may indeed be the right price), but until we can find prudent, reasonable and responsible destinies for the income our oil sales generate.

When oil prices skyrocketed in the 1970’s, the country went the route of mega-projects; duties to protect against imports, subsidies and all of the other ingredients which eventually proved to be wrong. At least, however, these were the result of a plan and a vision. Today, there isn’t one coherent statement, not even an incoherent one, with respect to a development model applicable to Venezuela.

These comments are not aimed at paralyzing the oil industry’s current plans. On the contrary. We have read in this week’s press about the need to isolate the country’s fiscal accounts from the ups and downs of oil prices. In my humble and probably validated opinion, we should probably be doing just the opposite in order to give our industry an even chance to fight for its markets. We should be isolating our oil industry from our fiscal appetite.

The previous strategy of reducing production and selling at lower prices represents, in addition to minimizing investment requirements, the milking of our cash cow, PDVSA. Today’s strategy implies that we must cover increasing needs for investment in the face of falling prices with drastic reductions in fiscal spending. We still have a long way to go before we can be convinced that the political will to reduce spending is really out there. To begin with, the US$ 2 billion the country reaped from the oil opening, which should have been earmarked for PDVSA’s own investments and expansion, have already been spent. As usual, there is nothing left!

In the Daily Journal, Caracas, March 20, 1998

Restructuring PDVSA - some doubts

The efficiency of the oil sector in Venezuela could be of more relative importance to the common citizen than is the efficiency of the government itself. Considering the brouhaha that the search for constitutional or electoral reform would cause, it is surprising how easily the reorganization of PDVSA went down.

When faced with all the country’s problems, most of its citizens, at least those that cannot even contemplate emigration, have placed all their hopes on the imminent development of a buoyant oil sector once production has been increased to six million barrels per day. In order to avoid the onset of profound depression, it is probable that most Venezuelans don’t question or even contemplate the possibility that all is not as it should be in the oil patch.

I am one of those that await only good things from our oil industry. However, since “the eye of the owner fattens the cattle”, all Venezuelans have the clear responsibility of keeping watch, issuing opinions and generally do all that is within reach to avoid that due to lack of effective control the industry dives into a tailspin. Without this control, and should the internal meritocracy (however meritorious it may be) be allowed to simply act as it pleases, it seems evident that an organization as rich as PDVSA, dedicated to an activity generous enough to permit the sale of a product with a production cost of about US$ 5 at US$ 20, will eventually degenerate.

In this sense, it behooves us to express our reservations about the amply publicized restructuring of the oil industry. As far as we understand, the plan is based on the substitution of the current organization, represented by Lagoven, Maraven and Corpoven, all of which functioned integrally as operators, with specialized companies designed to cover specific functions, among them exploration and production, manufacture and commercialization and services.

It could be that I have been overly innocent, but I was always under the impression that by splitting the Venezuelan oil industry into three operating companies, we had the keys to some control over it. This division allowed for certain competition, guaranteed a basis for comparison and finally, created different specialized professional teams which in one way or another kept an eye on each other.

I was, however, never so innocent as to figure that this control was perfect. Evidently this three-way split created much duplication of costs. The solution, however, seemed to be satisfactory when compared to alternatives such as the politicization of the industry or the awarding of total independence (upon which we would have had to light candles to our favorite Saint).

The new Plan has been justified with the following arguments: a) estimated savings that have quickly grown from US$ 1 billion to US$ 2 billion annually; b) the need to elevate the country’s participation in the international market; and c) as a simple response to organizational tendencies and pressures relative to the industry itself.

These arguments don’t completely convince me. Evidently, some savings are always possible. However, if savings such as those mentioned above are possible without adversely affecting the company’s operations, it would imply the recognition of such an incredible inefficiency that the first administrative act we should request is the immediate removal of the entire Board of Directors of PDVSA.

The second argument, i.e. the need to elevate the country’s participation in the global market, has more to do with abandoning the agreements established by OPEC than with a plan for reorganization. Finally, we should not be comparing the organization of a state owned company like PDVSA with private oil companies that operate in a world of shareholders, stock markets and other elements that exercise control over management.

Until I hear arguments to my satisfaction that address the issue of the control that our society has a right to, the Plan simply smacks of a proposal to centralize, both functions as well as power. In this sense, I believe the Plan could simply accelerate the degeneration which I feel the industry is doomed to. Additionally, why are we so set on decentralizing the country’s government, infrastructure, etc. if centralization by function is so beneficial?

In Daily Journal, Caracas, November 13, 1997