Oil and the Stockholm Syndrome

Fact No. 1: In 1980 the nominal price of oil (Arabian Light) was US$ 36 per barrel. In constant dollar prices calculated using the GDP deflator with 1998 as base, this was equivalent to US$ 67. By the end of 1998 the price of oil was US$ 12.20. In real terms it means that if the price index of oil in 1980 was 100% then in 1998 it was only 18%.

Fact No. 2: The index of oil products retail prices in 1980 was equal to 100%, in the United Kingdom, it reached 247% in 1998.

Fact No. 3: The amazing difference in how the two oil-related indexes developed can only be explained by taxes. As an example, in the UK in 1980 the ad-valorem taxes on gasoline were 85%; at the end of 1998 the same taxes were 456%.

Conclusion. Oil demand and oil prices are being held hostage by the taxes levied on various oil products by most oil-consuming countries. Had it not been for these sky-high discriminatory taxes, Venezuela would today be selling more oil at higher prices, easily repaying its foreign borrowings, and not even requiring a credit rating.

Adding insult to injury, the before mentioned taxes were slammed on Venezuela's main export at a time when the country was busy reducing custom duties and opening up its economy to all type of foreign competition.

It is difficult, then, to understand why, thanks to their country’s press, radio and television, Venezuelans can only worry and feel guilty of the fact that perhaps the recent increases in the price of oil will be the detonator for inflation and worldwide recession.

Could it be that the Stockholm syndrome affects Venezuela (as well as all of the OPEC nations)? As all pseudo-psychologists and writers should know, the Stockholm syndrome is what happens when someone that has been kidnapped finally becomes sympathetic with the position of his captors and ultimately even begins to defend them.

If you doubt what I am saying, just think of how our neoliberals, while talking up the maximization of income as one of their credos, blithely forgive their foreign heroes by either ignoring the issue or by creating lame environmental excuses or by simply repeating absurdities as “being rentist is really not very good for the country”. I would specially like to see them sustain this last thesis in other countries, for example in those that do all that is possible to maximize their rent from intellectual property, to the point of turning us into their best collectors.

That’s it then. There is no doubt in my mind that the Stockholm syndrome, or something very similar, is alive and well in Venezuela’s economic policies.

We need a couple of couch sessions, this time with psychologists that are very different from those we have used up to now. Dr. International Monetary Freund turned out to be simply an unethical Dr. Fraud. While the latter was pretending to give us good advice, he would travel behind our backs throughout the world, preaching the marvels of increasing taxes on oil-based products, and when this was not sufficiently convincing, simply forcing the adoption of the policy.

With its inaction, OPEC is also a prime suspect of having come down with the same affliction. I sure hope that during their sessions next week, to be held in Vienna, they will find time to get the advice of a true Dr. Freud.

Only then will they realize that at US$ 30 per barrel, the price of oil is still less than 45% of what it was in 1980.

Only then will they be able to understand the true injustice present when a taxman of a consumer country perceives an income 4.8 times more than the producer of a non renewable asset. During February this year, premium unleaded gasoline was sold at the pump in the UK for US$ 1.18 per liter, distributed as follows: 20 cts for the producer, 5 cts for the distributor and 93 cts for the British taxman.

Only then will they know that the world is not threatened by oil prices. The world and economic growth is above all, threatened by taxes implement for the sake of easy tax collection.

Only then will they remember to ask for a reduction of oil taxes, as a quid-pro-quo for any increase in oil production.

OPEC friends, … please remember Stockholm.

Calculations based on information in World Oil Trends 1999 published by Arthur Andersen and Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

In the Daily Journal, Caracas, March 24, 2000

El petróleo y el síndrome de Estocolmo

Hecho 1. El precio del barril de petróleo, a finales de 1998, se situaba en sólo el 18% de su valor real en 1980.

Hecho 2. El índice de los precios reales de los productos petroleros a nivel consumidor, de un 100% en 1980, para 1998 se situaba en un increíble 247% para Inglaterra.

Hecho 3. La increíble diferencia en la evolución de los dos índices relacionados al petróleo solo puede explicarse con los impuestos. Los impuestos ad-valorem sobre la gasolina, calculados sobre la base de lo que recibe el Fisco, comparado con lo que reciben todos los demás eslabones, evolucionaron entre 1980 y 1998 en Inglaterra de un 85% a un 456%.

Conclusión. La demanda por el petróleo y sus precios se encuentra secuestrada por los impuestos cobrados a los distintos productos petroleros por la mayoría de los países consumidores de petróleo. Si no fuese por estos altísimos e discriminatorios impuestos, Venezuela estaría hoy vendiendo mas petróleo a mejores precios, fácilmente logrando repagar su deuda externa y sin ni siquiera requerir de una calificación crediiticia. Echando sal a la herida, tales impuestos, aplicados al principal producto de exportación de Venezuela, fueron creados mientras el país estaba ocupado reduciendo aranceles comerciales y abriendose para acoger todo tipo de inversión extranjera.

Ante tales hechos es difícil entender el porqué en Venezuela, en prensa, radio y televisión, a todo hora oímos venezolanos expresando tanto preocupación y hasta sentimiento de culpa, sobre la posibilidad de que los recientes aumentos del petróleo sean el detonante de una inflación y una recesión mundial.

¿Será que toda Venezuela (y la OPEP también) esta afectada por el síndrome de Estocolmo? Como todo pseudo-psicologo y articulista debe conocer, el síndrome de Estocolmo es aquel que se presenta cuando un secuestrado, después de un tiempo, comienza a simpatizar y hasta defender a su secuestrador.

En mi opinión, y aceptando gustosamente una segunda opinión de un psicólogo de verdad, los que sufren del síntoma mas agudo del mencionado síndrome, son nuestros neoliberales domésticos, en especial los extremistas. Hablando maravillas del mercado como instrumento para distribuir los recursos, y alabando todos los gurus y los países que permiten su pleno desarrollo, se desvelan por buscar argumentos y excusas irrelevantes, por ejemplo del tipo ambientalista, para todo aquello que pueda dificultar la implementación de su evangelio.

Si dudan de lo dicho, solo piensen en como nuestros neoliberales, predicando la maximización de la renta, le perdonan a sus héroes, su pecadillo de impuestos petroleros, ignorando el tema, creando fofas excusas ambientales o simplemente repitiendo estupideces tales como "no es bueno para el país el ser rentista". Ya quisiera yo verlos sostener tal tesis en otros países, por ejemplo en aquellos que hacen lo posible por maximizar la renta de la propiedad intelectual, hasta el grado de convertirnos a nosotros mismos en sus mejores cobradores.

Pues si, no me cabe duda, el síndrome de Estocolmo o algo muy similar afecta la política económica de Venezuela.

Necesitamos de unas cuantas sesiones de análisis - eso si, en este caso - con psicólogos muy distintos a los usados hasta la fecha. El Dr. International Monetary Freund termino siendo un Dr. Fraud poco ético. Al mismo tiempo que presumía de darnos buenos consejos, detrás de nuestra espalda, viajaba por todo el mundo pregonando las maravillas de mayores impuestos al petróleo - o, cuando no resultaba lo suficientemente convincente, simplemente obligando a que se adoptasen.

Con su falta de acción la OPEP también resulta sospechosa de estar contagiada por el síntoma. Espero que aprovechen las sesiones que próximamente inician en Viena, para conseguirse un verdadero Dr. Freud.

Solo así comprenderán que el precio de US$ 30 por barril es menos del 45% del precio de 1980.

Solo así comprenderán la injusticia presente cuando el fisco del país consumidor recibe un ingreso 4.8 veces superior que el percibido por el productor de un recurso natural no renovable. La semana que termino el pasado 25 de Febrero, la gasolina premium sin plomo se vendía en Inglaterra en US$ 1.18 por litro. Tal monto se distribuye, 20 cts. para el productor, 5 cts. para el distribuidor y 93 cts. para el fisco ingles.

Solo así sabrán que el mundo no esta amenazado por altos precios petroleros, El mundo y su crecimiento económico esta ante nada amenazado por impuesto aplicados solo por su facilidad de cobro.

Solo así se recordaran pedir una reducción de impuestos como un razonable quid-pro-quo, de cualquier aumento en producción.

Amigos de las OPEC ……recuérdense de Estocolmo.

Los cálculos han sido basados en información de World Oil Trends 1999 publicada por Arthur Andersen y Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

The Petroleum Ombusdam Revisited

Almost one year ago, I published an articled titled “The Petroleum Ombudsman”. In this article I raised the need to institutionalize the figure of a qualified entity that could satisfy the requirements of the Venezuelan citizens of objective and independent information and analysis related to the country’s oil industry.

At that time, my observations were initially driven by a desire to know what effects on the industry the vast restructuring of PDVSA’s organization would have. In my opinion, there was a risk of centralization of the company.

Today, upon reviewing the myriad of questions PDVSA’s actions have raised in the Venezuelan society over the past year, I am even more convinced that the matter of the ombudsman for the petroluem sector must pass from being a mere suggestion to being an outright and urgent requirement. Let us see some examples:

The Oil Opening was justified by a lack of availability of resources to continue PDVSA’s investment plans. All of the funds raised by the opening, however, went directly into the Nation’s fiscal coffers. Who can explain that?

Without the slightest remorse, the National Executive requested that PDVSA withhold or delay payment of its obligations to local suppliers in an effort to further fight inflationary pressures, thereby becoming just another poor payer. Could this have been the beginning of an interesting swap aimed at sending Mr. Guisti to the Central Bank in return for Dr. Casas?

We are continually bombarded by adds in the press, selling courses and seminars to be dictated by an educational affiliate denominated PDVSA Cied. One single session, from 8 AM to 5 PM costs Bs. 300,000, an evident divorce from the economic realities of the country. When was PDVSA authorized by the country to expand its scope of activities in this manner?

Everyone has been made aware of the dangers of lead in gasoline. The solution for this seems to be of lesser importance than the revamping of an immense amount of service stations which, in addition to dispensing gasoline, are also to sell snacks. Who establishes investment priorities?

If any market is to be considered a captive client for PDVSA, it should be the Venezuelan one. I find it difficult to visualize a supertanker from the gulf trying to pass gasoline through our port authorities with the aim of selling me the concept “Put a camel in your tank”. If this is so, and if PDVSA truly is short of resources, on what basis can they announce a plan to invest US$ 800 million over the next nine years in order to improve their service station network. Why aren’t these resources invested in countries who’s markets we should be conquering?

And while we are talking of PDV, how much did the changes in image and the marketing of a new logo and trademark cost us?

And speaking of logos and trademarks, I haven’t seen any of the large oil companies now coming into Venezuela to participate in the local markets make these changes in order to compete in our environment. In a world of global markets, global coherence would seem to be important. We are all aware of the PDVSA’s important participation in the US markets through its holdings in the CITGO network. Why, then, don’t we support this trademark and market it in Venezuela as well?

By raising these questions, I don’t wish to give the impression that I argue in favor of the Petroleum Ombudsman only to supervise PDVSA. It is also important to note that this office could also launch a vigorous defense of the industry’s interests at times when fiscal pressures are brought to bear by the National Executive. These pressures could ultimately lead to further indebtedness and/or endanger our goose of the golden eggs in many other ways.

If anyone still harbors doubts as to the need for the office of this ombudsman, it should be enough to reflect on the confusion and ado created by the question as to whether PDVSA has or has not legally complied with is fiscal obligations.

PDVSA is a State owned company, headed by Directors and Management designated by the State. We should therefore be able to expect a certain confidence an adherence by the same with the norms handed down by the State. If this were not so, it would seem to indicate a much more serious problem, one that cannot be solved merely by establishing a special SENIAT office within PDVSA.

In the Daily Journal May 4, 1998

Should we abandon OPEC?

Alternative 1: Continue in OPEC, produce little oil and sell it at reasonably high prices. Alternative 2: Abandon OPEC, expand production capacity and sell oil at relatively low prices, while conquering new markets in the process.

Venezuela’s future oil policy should lie somewhere on the axis formed by these extremes. We, as citizens, should supposedly form our own opinion as to where this ideal point should lie.

Over the last 20 years, I have consistently questioned the logic of a policy under which the members of a cartel have turned a blind eye to the diminishing strength of the latter, almost as if on purpose. This is the case of OPEC, which has, year after year, lost market share. In this sense, the only plausible response to the proposal of going out and aggressively conquering new markets should be “let’s go for it”.

Unfortunately, it is not quite like that. Even though I support this proposal on technical terms, I can’t quite seem to drum up enthusiasm. Neither because of the possibility of revindicating myself with an egoistic but savory “I told you so”, nor because of the possible inherent promise of the plan itself. The cause of my indifference is none other than my conviction that such a decision is in itself of little importance for the future of the country.

It does not suffice to follow a coherent oil sector policy. What really matters to the country is its final result. A decision that is technically wrong but produces satisfactory results is clearly better than the opposite. As far as the future of my country is concerned, I am not interested in applying the medical phrase that certifies that “the operation was a success, but the patient unfortunately has died”.

In its initial phases, OPEC generated large volumes of resources for Venezuela; more than sufficient to set the country on the road to development. This did not occur and there is no reason to believe that the country will manage to reap the non-perishable fruits of this development even if the next oil policy is successful.

Even though I realize that it is not popular today, and feeling a bit like a prehistoric hippie predicating “Love is all we need”, I will risk whispering the statement “oil is a valuable natural, non-renewable resource”.

Since oil is indeed valuable and because it is not renewable, prices have once upon a time been pushed up to nearly $ 40 per barrel and projected prices should probably be around $300 today. Since oil is valuable and non-renewable, it was also said that before liquidating it at low prices it would be better to leave it in the ground (for the benefit of our grandchildren).

If we were not all, myself included, simple egoists itching to get our hands on resources that would allow us to once again live an easy and happy life, we should really be leaving the oil in the ground today, thereby insuring the future of our country and our children. Not until the price is right (the current market price of US$ 12 may indeed be the right price), but until we can find prudent, reasonable and responsible destinies for the income our oil sales generate.

When oil prices skyrocketed in the 1970’s, the country went the route of mega-projects; duties to protect against imports, subsidies and all of the other ingredients which eventually proved to be wrong. At least, however, these were the result of a plan and a vision. Today, there isn’t one coherent statement, not even an incoherent one, with respect to a development model applicable to Venezuela.

These comments are not aimed at paralyzing the oil industry’s current plans. On the contrary. We have read in this week’s press about the need to isolate the country’s fiscal accounts from the ups and downs of oil prices. In my humble and probably validated opinion, we should probably be doing just the opposite in order to give our industry an even chance to fight for its markets. We should be isolating our oil industry from our fiscal appetite.

The previous strategy of reducing production and selling at lower prices represents, in addition to minimizing investment requirements, the milking of our cash cow, PDVSA. Today’s strategy implies that we must cover increasing needs for investment in the face of falling prices with drastic reductions in fiscal spending. We still have a long way to go before we can be convinced that the political will to reduce spending is really out there. To begin with, the US$ 2 billion the country reaped from the oil opening, which should have been earmarked for PDVSA’s own investments and expansion, have already been spent. As usual, there is nothing left!

In the Daily Journal, Caracas, March 20, 1998

The Petroleum Ombudsman

Ten years ago during an interview with a local reporter, I expressed my worries about the long term future of organizations such as Petroleos de Venezuela. While satisfying a real need for freedom of action and informative confidentiality, we have unfortunately also set the organization on a path towards degeneration of its operative capacity, no matter how efficient it may have been at the starting point. During this interview I even stated that the day could conceivably come when it could theoretically be more attractive to have politicians sit on PDVSA’s board than suffer the effects of an encysted meritocracy, unaware of the country’s realities. Venezuela’s challenge at that moment was to find a way to avoid this. It still is.

During the last few weeks we have received information pertaining to our oil industry which seems a bit strange and contradictory. Some “experts” harp on the fact that the internal cost of producing gasoline exceeds by far its price in the national market while others maintain just the opposite. The industry has announced a reorganization plan which would result in annual savings of US$ 2 billion. The other side of the coin of such sweet savings would seem to be the bitter possibility that the industry has been throwing these resources out the window all these years.

What does all this news really mean? Are we in bad shape but doing better, or are we in good shape but doing worse? This is very difficult to answer. As Venezuelans, shareholders and indirect beneficiaries of the petroleum industry we should have access to qualified sources of information. This information should be somewhat more objective than that we receive today from sources dedicated to different agendas, may they be government, opposition or industry insiders.

In this sense, I believe it may be interesting to promote the appointment of a Petroleum Ombudsman who, beginning with the limited role of providing truthful information, could eventually develop into a real defender of the Nation’s interests. The Ombudsman, a word of Swedish origin that identifies a spokesman and representative of the interests of society, is a figure that is used in many countries and performs many different functions in areas that are of relatively lesser importance than what the oil industry is to Venezuelans.

In addition to his role of truthful informer, the Petroleum Ombudsman can assist in the evaluation of the consequences of a great variety of aspects that affect the industry. One interesting case would be the implications of a request by Venezuela’s Central Bank to expand the oil industry’s role by asking it to delay payments to suppliers of goods and services in order to reduce excess liquidity in the local market and, as a result, fight inflationary pressures.

Another matter on which the solid, objective opinion of an Ombudsman would be more than welcome is the oil opening. Our happiness would be more complete when we are asked to celebrate the oil opening, could we only rest assured that the reasons for this aperture are not related to excessive fiscal pressure imposed on the industry which has limited its investment possibilities and even forced it to contract debt.

The existence of an Petroleum Ombudsman that is respected by the country would guarantee the collaboration of the nation’s citizens when it is justified. I am sure that among all Venezuelans of good faith that love this country, there isn’t one that would outright wish to contribute towards a deficit for the oil operators by purchasing gasoline at prices below production costs. On the other hand, among these same Venezuelans, very few would be prepared to pay a higher price in order to contribute to a Central Government that squanders its resources.

During the interview I mentioned at the beginning of this article, I maintained that should PDVSA be politicized, citizens would at least be in the position every five years of being able to pass judgment as shareholders of its management’s achievements. This was interpreted by the reporter as a recommendation to politicize PDVSA. This, as you can imagine, caused much embarrassment, and I was very relieved that the article was published on Saturday and during a period of vacations when few people read the press anyway. Today, talk about politicizing PDVSA does not continue to be a crime when we are seeing the latter become a political player; what is the same is not cheating (lo que es igual no es trampa).

In the Daily Journal, Caracas, August 7, 1997

El ombudsman petrolero (El Defensor del Pueblo en el área petrolero)

 

Hace diez años, durante una entrevista con un periodista local, expresé mis preocupaciones sobre el futuro a largo plazo de organizaciones como Petróleos de Venezuela. Si bien satisfacemos una necesidad real de libertad de acción y de confidencialidad informativa, lamentablemente también hemos encaminado a la organización hacia la degeneración de su capacidad operativa, por muy eficiente que haya sido en el punto de partida. Durante esta entrevista incluso dije que podría llegar el día en que, en teoría, sería más atractivo tener políticos en el directorio de PDVSA que sufrir los efectos de una meritocracia enquistada, inconsciente de las realidades del país. El desafío de Venezuela en ese momento era encontrar una manera de evitarlo. Sigue siendo.

 

Durante las últimas semanas hemos recibido información sobre nuestra industria petrolera que parece un poco extraña y contradictoria. Algunos “expertos” insisten en que el costo interno de producir gasolina supera con creces su precio en el mercado nacional mientras otros sostienen todo lo contrario. La industria ha anunciado un plan de reorganización que supondría un ahorro anual de 2.000 millones de dólares. La otra cara de la moneda de estos dulces ahorros parecería ser la amarga posibilidad de que la industria haya estado tirando estos recursos por la ventana todos estos años.

 

¿Qué significa realmente toda esta noticia? ¿Estamos en malas condiciones pero nos va mejor, o estamos en buena forma pero nos va peor? Esto es muy difícil de responder. Como venezolanos, accionistas y beneficiarios indirectos de la industria petrolera debemos tener acceso a fuentes de información calificadas. Esta información debería ser algo más objetiva que la que recibimos hoy de fuentes dedicadas a diferentes agendas, ya sean expertos del gobierno, de la oposición o de la industria.

 

En este sentido, creo que puede ser interesante promover el nombramiento de un Ombudsman Petrolero que, partiendo de la limitada función de brindar información veraz, pueda eventualmente convertirse en un verdadero defensor de los intereses de la Nación. El Ombudsman, palabra de origen sueco que identifica a un portavoz y representante de los intereses de la sociedad, es una figura que se utiliza en muchos países y desempeña muy diversas funciones en áreas que son de relativamente menor importancia que lo que es la industria petrolera para los venezolanos. .

 

Además de su papel de informador veraz, el Ombudsman Petrolero puede ayudar en la evaluación de las consecuencias de una gran variedad de aspectos que afectan a la industria. Un caso interesante serían las implicaciones de una solicitud del Banco Central de Venezuela para ampliar el papel de la industria petrolera pidiéndole que retrase los pagos a los proveedores de bienes y servicios para reducir el exceso de liquidez en el mercado local y, como resultado, luchar contra la inflación. presiones.

 

Otro asunto sobre el que sería más que bienvenida la opinión sólida y objetiva de un Defensor del Pueblo es la apertura petrolera. Nuestra felicidad sería más completa cuando nos invitaran a celebrar la apertura petrolera, ¿podríamos estar seguros de que las razones de esta apertura no están relacionadas con una presión fiscal excesiva impuesta a la industria que ha limitado sus posibilidades de inversión e incluso la ha obligado a endeudarse.

La existencia de un Ombudsman Petrolero que sea respetado por el país garantizaría la colaboración de los ciudadanos de la nación cuando esté justificada. Estoy seguro que entre todos los venezolanos de buena fe que aman a este país, no hay uno que desee de plano contribuir al déficit de los operadores petroleros comprando gasolina a precios inferiores a los costos de producción. Por otro lado, entre esos mismos venezolanos, muy pocos estarían dispuestos a pagar un precio más alto para contribuir a un Gobierno Central que despilfarra sus recursos.

 

Durante la entrevista que mencioné al inicio de este artículo, sostuve que si PDVSA se politizara, los ciudadanos estarían al menos cada cinco años en la posición de poder emitir juicios como accionistas sobre los logros de su gestión. Esto fue interpretado por el periodista como una recomendación para politizar a PDVSA. Esto, como puedes imaginar, me causó mucha vergüenza y me sentí muy aliviado de que el artículo se publicara el sábado y durante un período de vacaciones en el que, de todos modos, poca gente leía la prensa. Hoy hablar de politizar a PDVSA no sigue siendo un delito cuando vemos a ésta convertirse en un actor político; Lo que es igual no es trampa.